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Over the course of a 10-week long internship in Haiti, I had the opportunity to work on 
pension statements for the employees at Manutech Inc., an electronics manufacturing company. 
The mandatory private sector pension plan administered by Office Nationale de Assurance 
(ONA) is inadequate and does not seem to be promising for workers after retirement. Through 
the company, I had the privilege to meet Tom Adamson who has been in Haiti for the past 30 
years and is an expert on pensions. My discussions with Tom on the need to reform pensions in 
Haiti got me interested in pensions and prompted me to do more research on pension plans in 
Haiti. 
I will discuss the need for pension reforms in Haiti in order to create financial security for 
workers after retirement. The paper starts with a general introduction to the need for financial 
security for the elderly. It gives a brief description of the current economic and political situation 
in Haiti. The two main pension plans, the Civil Service Pension Plan (public sector pension plan) 
and ONA (private sector plan) are described with supporting schedules. I will discuss the 
problems with these pension plans and the need for reforms.  
I will introduce the Personal Retirement Savings Plan (PRSP) as an alternative to the 
current plans. Chile switched to a defined contribution plan in the 1980s. Around the same time, 
three counties in Texas opted out of United States Social Security and created personal 
retirement accounts for public employees. The paper evaluates these two examples to support the 
PRSP. Tom Adamson has implemented this plan at his company, SAFICO, on a short scale. The 
PRSP has a credit plan attached to it which enhances it in the short term as well as in the long 
term. SAFICO workers under this plan have overwhelmingly accepted it. The paper describes 
the plan in detail and commends it. The conclusion reiterates the need for and steps toward 
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pension reforms in Haiti. 
Pension Reforms in Haiti 
Introduction 
Security for the old aged 
Declining fertility and the rising life expectancy as a result of advancement in modern 
medicine has increased the proportion of old people in most societies. By 2050, the proportion of 
people over 60 to those aged 15–59 would climb from about 30% now to over 60% (The 
Economist). Financial support for the old aged will be a critical issue in coming years. Old1 
people have traditionally depended on their families for support, but such systems are 
weakening. On the other hand, government pensions are proving unsustainable and many 
countries, including developed nations like the United States and nations in Europe, are facing 
severe problems funding pensions for retirees. The World Bank’s Averting the Old Age Crisis: 
Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, focuses on the issue of financial security for 
the old aged. The report identifies three functions of old age financial security systems: 
redistribution, saving and insurance, and suggests that governments should develop three pillars 
of old age security—a publicly managed mandatory system, a privately managed mandatory 
savings system, and a voluntary savings. 
Different types of security for the old age people 
People have traditionally depended on their families to help them in their old age. More 
than half of the world’s population in 1994 was estimated to reply exclusively on informal and 
traditional arrangements for income security (The World Bank). However, this has changed over 
the years due to lifestyle changes throughout the world. Young generations are moving into the 
cities due to urbanization. Their parents are forced to stay behind at the houses or end up in 
nursing homes. Over 100 Haitian workers at Manutech Inc. filled out a short survey that asked 
questions on informal means of financial security (see Box 1). Only 16 out of 100 workers said 
that their grandparents were living with them, if alive. More workers who were 26 or younger 
said that they do not expect financial help from their children when they retire. 
Most old people in developed countries have some type of retirement benefits. There are 
government implemented pension plans in almost every developed country. There are two main 
types of pension plans: defined benefit and defined contribution. A defined benefit pension plan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Old”	  people	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  people	  that	  are	  over	  50	  years	  or	  older	  and	  have	  retired	  from	  their	  jobs.	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promises a specified monthly benefit on retirement that is predetermined by a formula. The 
formula is usually based on the employee's earnings history, age, and duration of service. The 
employers fund defined benefit pensions by saving money over time. In a defined contribution 
plan, the amount of the employer's annual contribution is set in advance. The payout depends on 
investment returns. Most of the current pension plans are defined benefit plans. However, recent 
pension reforms have tried to address the underfunding of defined benefit plans and provide 
incentives to save via defined contribution plans (Cocco).  
Haiti 
Economy 
Despite optimistic investment and revenue growth in the first quarter of FY 2010, the 7.0 
magnitude earthquake set the economy back, and it contracted by 5.3% in FY 2010 (CIA). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected growth to rebound strongly in FY 2011, to about 
9%, driven mostly by reconstruction and foreign investments (globalEdge). However, Haiti 
remains the poorest country in the Americas and one of the poorest in the world (with a GDP per 
capita of US$ 671 in 2010), with significant deficits in basic services (IMF). Over half of its 
population of 10 million lives on less than US$1 per day, and approximately 80% live on less 
than US$2 per day, and it also has a high gap of income and unequal wealth distribution, with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.59 as of 2009 (The World Bank). Some other key economic facts about 
Haiti can be found in Appendix A. 
A study conducted by the CIA reports that Haiti's relative economic stagnation is a result 
of inappropriate economic policies, political instability, a shortage of good arable land, 
environmental deterioration, continued reliance on traditional technologies, under-
capitalization and lack of public investment in human resources, migration of large 
portions of the skilled population, a weak national savings rate, and the lack of a 
functioning judicial system (CIA). 
Why pension reforms? 
Developing and underdeveloped countries are often helped by developed countries and 
international non-profit organizations through monetary donations, food aid and other services. 
While such efforts have helped the poor economies in the short run, they prove unsustainable in 
the long run. Many times, the aid does not reach the people who need it the most, due to corrupt 
governments. Sometimes, the aid provided with good intentions result in deterioration of local 
3
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businesses. For example, in the 1990s, President Clinton pushed the Haitian government to 
remove tariffs on imported rice which led to great losses for the Haitian rice farmers. President 
Clinton admitted, “It was a mistake. ... I had to live every day with the consequences of the lost 
capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did” (Dupuy). 
Haiti needs to develop financial tools that will prove beneficial in the long run. Pensions will 
serve as a source of income for workers in Haiti to support themselves when they retire. Small 
financial measures such as these would develop a sustainable economy and positive economic 
growth in the long term. 
Current Pension Plans in Haiti 
Introduction 
The pension system in Haiti includes a civil service pension mandatory plan, a private 
sector mandatory plan, around seven state owned enterprise mandatory plans, and around 35 
private sector corporate voluntary plans. They all are pure defined benefit plans with the 
exception of the private sector corporate plans, which are mainly defined contribution plans. The 
corporate plans work mainly as tax advantage savings plans that corporations set up on behalf of 
their employees so that they can access credit against their own and their employer’s 
contributions at better rates than are currently afforded by micro credit and banking institutions 
(IMF). There is no public information available on the corporate plans. Thus, they are not 
covered in this paper. 
Civil Service Pension Plan (CSPP)2 
The Civil Service Pension Plan is administered by a Directorate in the Ministry of 
Finance and it covers civil servants in the central government, doctor and nurses, teachers at all 
level of public education, police, and judiciary. Civil servants in local authorities have no 
pension arrangements while the CSPP also administers separate plans for the Parliament and the 
Armed Forces. Around 50,000 individuals contribute 8% of their base salary into the CSPP. The 
State stopped matching contributions in the mid-nineties and has not yet resumed 100% 
matching. Around 11.5 thousand individuals received retirement benefits in 2007, generating a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Most of the data presented here can be found in the 2007 IMF Report: Financial Sector Assessment Program in 
Haiti. 
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system dependency ratio of 4.35. The vast majority of retirement benefits are represented by old 
age benefits. Nevertheless, the CSPP also offers a survivor pension for spouses (50% of old age 
benefits) and for children younger than 25 years of age (the other 50%, if alive and entitled). 
Civil servants also benefit from non-contributory health and life insurance coverage fully self-
insured by the State (IMF). 
Contribution income amounted to around HGD40 3 million per month in 2007, while 
benefits amounted to around HGD37 million per month generating an average monthly surplus 
of HGD3 million (IMF). Benefits are exclusively paid via checks (an extremely costly and error 
prone system) that individuals need to collect in person or through delegation at one of the eight 
departmental offices of the CSPP in the country. Interestingly, beneficiaries have to re-register 
every fiscal year in person to be entitled to benefits for the following year. This drastically 
reduces the likelihood that the CSPP pays ghost pensions. Surpluses accumulate in a non-
remunerated account in the BRH (Banque de la République d'Haïti). Only recently was the CSPP 
authorized to manage and invest reserves. As a consequence, in 2007, HGD500 million were 
transferred into a foreign exchange deposit also in the BRH (IMF). It is expected that the 
treasury will define the strategic asset allocation for such reserves with BNC (Bank Nationale de 
Crédit) being the implementing agency.  
Members can retire according to the schedule in Appendix B. There are some exceptions 
to this table for nurses, doctors and teachers, for whom no minimum retirement age and lower 
ceilings apply (Social Security Administration). Old age pension benefits are generous but they 
are not indexed to inflation or real wage growth rate; this quickly reduces their purchasing power 
over time. The inflation was 9% in 2011 and is expected to increase throughout 2012 (The 
Economic Intelligence Unit). Increase in food and commodity prices can be related to an 
increasing foreign population (U.N. peacekeepers, non-profit organizations) in major cities like 
Port-au-Prince and Jacmel. Effects of pensions without indexation have been noticed in other 
countries too. In Venezuela, real pensions fell 60 percent during the 1980s largely because of 
inflation without indexation (World Bank). In addition, there is no mortality table for civil 
servants and no actuarial evaluation of the plan has been conducted.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  exchange	  rate	  on	  5/1/2012	  was	  1USD	  =	  HGD42.35.	  The	  exchange	  rate	  fluctuated	  widely	  in	  2011	  (See	  
Appendix	  J).	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The Directorate of the CSPP could, in theory, create very accurate benefit, age and 
gender distributions of retirees, but it lacks the information technology capacity to do so. The 
database underpinning the payroll system should be assessed to establish its ability to produce 
the necessary data on contributors (age, gender and wage distributions over time), in order to 
construct a mortality table and to conduct actuarial evaluations. No financial statements are 
published by the Ministry of Finance on the actuarial or financial viability of the plan. In 
summary, the Directorate administering the CSPP is merely used as a benefit payment agency, 
while it could be effectively and cheaply transformed into a civil service pension analysis office 
to advise the government on public pension, staffing and remuneration policies. 
Private sector social security scheme (ONA)4 
The Office Nationale d’Assurance-Vielliesse (ONA) was established in 1965 as the 
reincarnation of the old Institut d’Assurances Sociales d’Haiti (IDASH) established in 1949 
(SSA). Its regulatory framework comprises the establishing law of 1965 amended in 1967 and 
several complementary laws that have progressively transformed the mandate of the institution 
from a pure retirement income plan to a housing and savings plan. These include: in 1968, the 
enactment of implementing provisions; in 1971, the introduction of personal loans; in 1974, the 
introduction of mortgage loans; in 1976, the introduction of disabled benefits provisions and the 
relaxation of mortgage loan provisions; and in 1983, the reform of its governance with the 
establishment of a joint board (“Conseil d’Administration des Organisms de Securite Sociale” or 
CAOSS) for the ONA, OFATMA and two other noncontributory social assistance programs 
(SSA). 
The ONA is a technical and administrative division of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (MAST) with its own jurisdiction and financial autonomy. The ONA covers all workers 
in the private and public sectors not covered by the CSPP. Salaried individuals are required to 
participate while self-employed and workers in the informal sector can participate voluntarily. 
The coverage rate is relatively small: in 2007, only 234,000 individuals were active contributors 
representing 2.8% of the population, 8.6% of the labor force, 12.1% of the formal sector labor 
force, and 12.4% of the formal sector labor force not covered by the CSPP (The World Bank). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The numbers presented here can be found on U.S. Social Security Administration website under Caribbean nations. 
In addition, many of the statements made here are from my direct experience dealing with ONA during my 
internship. 
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ONA reported that 12,000 beneficiaries currently receive a pension from the ONA producing a 
highly favorable system dependency ratio of 119. 
However, this high ratio does not correctly reflect the unhealthy financial situation of the 
ONA, given the erratic collection capacity of the institution and its high administrative expenses. 
Operational expenses amounted to HGD380 million—around 36% of contribution income (see 
Appendix C). This includes HGD55 million (1/5 of total expenses) in various non-identifiable 
sponsorships. Old age pension benefits are not as generous as old age benefits in the CSPP as 
they replace a maximum of 30% of average best ten years salary. Members can retire according 
to the schedule in Appendix 3. The formula is that ONA receives 12% of payroll (half from the 
worker and half from the employer) when they have contributed for 20 years and attained the 
ripe old age of 55 (current life expectancy in Haiti is about 50–60) they can draw a pension 
which is the equivalent of 1/3 of the average of the last 10 years. There is no provision for cost of 
living adjustments; either in calculating the base average or in the pension benefits itself, in spite 
of 20 years of double digit inflation. 
The ONA also has a lending program. Mortgage loans are by far the largest share of 
loans granted at an average rate of 14% to 17% (ONA Office). Such high interest rates result in 
high default risk. Given the low earnings of an average Haitian worker, interest payments are not 
made on time. This results in workers losing their collateral, the remaining and future pension 
savings with ONA. Personal loans are also granted up to 50% of accumulated individual account 
balances at a rate of 6%. Salary advance loans up to 4 to 5 month salary are another category and 
finally, advances on pension benefits are also granted. The maturity of these loans does not 
exceed 18 months with the exception of mortgage loans, the maturity of which can be up to 20 
years. A minimum of 5 years of contributions is necessary for members to qualify for a loan. 
Additional credit scoring is conducted by the ONA staff but the scoring procedure appears to 
have been rather ineffective in the past, at least as far as mortgage loans are concerned. The ONA 
admits to lacking investment and credit analysis skills to conduct mortgage loan operations and 
suspended all new mortgage loans in 2007.  
The dire reserve management situation is the consequence of a developmental general 
mandate for the ONA, lack of investment skills, inadequate governance structure and possibly 
undue political interference. Since inception the ONA was supposed to have a tripartite board of 
directors, but this was never appointed. The 1983 Law establishes the CAOSS and in 2005 the 
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transition government requested nominations from the employer’s association and unions but the 
President of the Republic has yet to appoint the nominees (The World Bank). Tom Adamson was 
nominated to be on the board two times since 2008. It is believed that the appointment of a board 
of directors, even if only tripartite, would improve transparency in the management of the ONA. 
Recommendation—Personal Retirement Savings Plan 
Example—Chilean Reformed Pension System 
In the late 1980s, Chile faced a huge problem with their pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
pension plan. The increasing number of retirees, high evasion rates, and immense benefits 
promised by earlier political leaders led to unbearable stress on the social security system. The 
pension system was paying more benefits than it was receiving in contributions, and the 
projected actuarial balance was greater than the country’s GDP (Soto). Chile overhauled their 
pay-as-you-go pension system into personal retirement accounts. The retirement age was raised 
to 65 for men and 60 for women. Chilean workers contribute about 12.5 percent of their wages to 
the old aged, disability and survivorship. Nearly 80 percent of the employee's contributions go 
towards personal accounts which are administered by privately owned pension management 
institutions; the remainder pays for disability and survivorship insurance (7 percent), 
administrative fees, and commissions (13 percent) (Soto).  
The introduction of a privately managed pension system in Chile, based on individual 
capital accounts, has attracted world-wide attention. “This reform—as well as other market 
oriented structural changes—and the significant improvement in Chilean economic performance 
has led many observers to conclude a direct link, especially through the rise in private domestic 
savings generated through the new pension system” (OECD). 
Example—Texas Model for Fixing Social Security5 
In September 2011, Texas Governor Rick Perry pointed to three counties in Texas, 
Galveston, Matagorda, and Brazoria, as a solution to fix the United States Social Security 
problems. These three counties opted out of social security decades ago and created personal 
retirement accounts for public employees. County workers in these three counties have reaped 
higher benefits under this plan. These counties—unlike almost all others in the United States—
face no long-term unfunded pension liabilities (Merrill).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  article	  “Perry	  Is	  Right:	  There	  Is	  a	  Texas	  Model	  for	  Fixing	  Social	  Security”	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The Alternate Plan is different from a traditional defined benefit or defined contribution 
plan. Employees contribute 6.2% of their income with a 100% matching by the counties 
(Merrill). After the contribution is made, the county is not financially obligated to manage the 
funds, thus avoiding long term unfunded pension liabilities. The contributions are managed by 
financial institutions that bid on the money and guarantee a minimum interest rate. First 
Financial Benefits, Inc. currently manages the contributions. During the last ten years, the 
accounts have earned between 3.75% and 5.75% every year, with the average around 5% 
(Merrill). When the market is positive, the contributions get higher returns, and when the market 
goes down, contributions still make something. 
The Alternate Plan is potentially a good substitute for social security. However, if 
everyone was to opt out of Social Security today, the shortfall of money for the current pension 
receivers would be immense and create more problems. A reform plan, such as the Alternate 
Plan would need to address the transition costs. 
Personal Retirement Savings Plan coupled with Credit Plan6 
Why Implement Personal Retirement Savings Plan in Haiti 
As mentioned in a previous section, ONA does not provide enough benefit for a decent 
retirement. The pension one receives from ONA represents only about 22% of the last salary and 
there is no provision for increases in the annual cost of living. In most countries a comfortable 
pension represents at least 50–60% of the last salary with regular cost of living increases. The 
government or companies should set up a system so that their loyal employees do not end up 
living in poverty in their old age after working for many years. It can be very complicated to put 
together a company pension plan similar to ONA (defined benefit); such a plan has many 
drawbacks. Many companies in the United States have made news for going bankrupt because of 
their obligations to their retired workers through open-ended pension plans. Retirement Savings 
Plans are becoming widely accepted with no open-ended obligations. Under such plans, 
employees are able to build up capital, with the employer’s help, that will help finance their 
retirement. This plan allows employees to know what their savings are at any moment. In 
addition, most banks in Haiti offer special accounts for Retirement Savings Plans. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  plan	  has	  already	  been	  implemented	  at	  Tom	  Adamson’s	  company,	  SAFICO	  Haiti,	  on	  a	  small	  scale.	  This	  paper	  
evaluates	  this	  plan	  and	  uses	  data	  from	  SAFICO	  to	  support	  arguments.	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Importance of Credit Plan attached to the Retirement Savings Plan 
If a retirement savings plan (RSP) already exists, or is going to be set up, it costs very 
little to add a credit plan. The employer will be providing a big additional benefit for their 
employees at relatively little cost. Access to credit is the short term benefit that guarantees that 
the employees willingly participate in the retirement savings plan. RSPs with a credit plan have a 
greater annual rate of return compared to depositing them in a savings account at a bank. If the 
objective of the RSP is to enable employees to accumulate the equivalent of 6 years’ salary, then 
the credit plan allows the employee to reach this objective much more easily (see Appendix G). 
With access to a line of credit the employee can more easily face up to many recurring expenses: 
school fees, rent, health problems, funerals, etc. (see Appendix H). The line of credit gets bigger 
each year and can eventually enable them to solve their major problems and might even help 
them invest in a business to create another source of income. 
How does interest calculation work? 
At the end of each month, all of the money in the RSP is either out in loans to the 
workers or in the account at a bank. During the month, an account will receive contributions and 
loan payments and give out new loans. At the end of the month, the company will calculate how 
much principal is out in loans and how much is in each individual RSP account. Money sent to 
the bank cannot be withdrawn until the employee retires or leaves the company. Thus, if 30% of 
the total funds are out in loans, each employee’s bank account will be 70% of what he or she has 
in the RSP regardless of how much he or she owes on the loan. At the end of the month, their 
account balances will be determined and deposits will be made to bring them up to this level. 
The employees do not have direct access to the accounts, except through the company, so they 
won’t borrow all their savings, quit the company, then go and clean out their account. The 
interest earned, at the bank and on the loans, is calculated on the last day of the month and 
distributed amongst the workers according to their percentage of the total at the end of the 
previous month. 
How do the loans work—SAFICO example 
Once a worker has accumulated a certain amount (say $50) in her account she is allowed 
to borrow up to 100% of her account balance. At SAFICO, Tom Adamson sits down with his 
employees to figure out how much they are allowed to borrow, how much they want to borrow 
and in how many months they want to pay back the loan. Tom does not allow repayment to go 
10
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beyond 12 months. However, he is considering allowing longer term loans for home construction 
or investment in a business since he has seen a very strong repayment rate. SAFICO charges 2% 
a month on their loans and this seems very reasonable for workers because they don’t borrow too 
much and they must pay back within a year. However, the annual return on the loan is quite 
favorable due to this scheme (see Appendix I). The setup for such a system is quick and it can be 
easily managed. At the end of the month, all employees receive a pension statement, which 
informs them of their total contribution to date, the amount of interest they have accumulated, 
and the amount of outstanding loans, if any.  
Benefits of Credit Plan attached to the Retirement Savings Plan 
In the short term, the workers have access to a line of credit that gets bigger every year. 
Well managed, this enables them to deal more easily with many expenses, both foreseeable and 
unforeseeable. At SAFICO most workers now have between five and six months’ savings in the 
RSP with a 6% employee contribution and 100% employer matching. If this continues, 
according to Tom Adamson, in ten years the workers should have the equivalent of two years’ 
salary. In the long term, since the workers are paying commercial interest rates of 2% per month 
on their loans, the annual return will be raised on the fund as a whole. Since 2004, SAFICO has 
started lending anywhere from 25% to 45% of the total out in loans at any one time. This has 
meant an annual rate of growth of between 11 and 12% (see Appendix J). 
In the short term, companies can avoid lending their own capital to the workers once the 
credit plan has reached a certain size. If a company already has a RSP, it costs very little to 
establish a credit plan which is perceived as an important benefit by the workers. In the long 
term, companies can benefit by preventing older employees from becoming a burden by 
receiving unfunded pensions out of cash flow or by staying on payroll beyond their productive 
years. 
There has been a wave of reform in Latin America moving away from Defined Benefit 
towards Defined Contribution Plans (with individual accounts). However, none of these plans 
lend money to subscribers; most of the money is parked in government bonds or other local 
financial instruments. The criticisms of these new plans are that they are still plagued by a fair 
amount of delinquency and that they cannot attract subscribers from the informal sector. This 
leaves many people in the society with inadequate or no coverage when they reach retirement 
age. Both of these problems might stem from the fact that the retirement benefits are so far into 
11
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the future that without effective compulsion, many people are hesitant to subscribe. The credit 
plan offers a tangible immediate benefit which could reduce this problem. Tom Adamson 
recently reported that workers at SAFICO unanimously asked to increase their contributions to 
the plan twice because they know that the money is available for them when they need it. 
Conclusions 
Underdeveloped countries are often helped financially through donations and funding. 
Such help might solve problems in the short term, but will not help the country develop in the 
long term. Microcredit gives people access to money but does not incorporate saving 
mechanisms in poorer society. For underdeveloped nations to be self-sustainable, improvements 
in financial institutions and awareness of savings among people are necessary. Poor countries 
like Haiti can start reforming pension plans for long term growth and better living conditions. 
The poorest groups in such societies can still get social assistance, such as cash, through social 
pensions7. 
The current pension plans in Haiti need to be reassessed for higher efficiency. An 
actuarial evaluation for these plans should be conducted to better assess the contributions under 
these plans. The amount received after retirement should be indexed for factors such as inflation 
and wage growth. The IT technology at the Civil Service Pension Plan office and ONA needs to 
be developed to reduce administrative expenses and increase accurate bookkeeping. 
Implementing personal retirement savings plans, similar to Tom Adamson’s SAFICO, through 
companies might be a good substitute for contributions to ONA. The pension system in Haiti is 
still in its early stages with a favorable dependency ratio. Switching to personal accounts would 
incur relatively low transition costs. Personal Retirement Savings Plan could develop the weak 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Social	  pensions	  are	  non-­‐contributory	  cash	  payments	  to	  older	  people.	  They	  are	  helpful	  in	  situations	  where	  older	  
people	  have	  not	  contributed	  to	  a	  formal	  pension	  plan.	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Box 1: Demographic Survey 
 
Data Collection: Workers at Manutech Inc. in Port-au-Price were asked to fill out a survey that 
asked questions about dependence on families for financial support. The survey asked for 
information such as gender, age, the number of people in the family and their relationships with 
each other, who provided financial support for the family, and if they expect their children or 
family to help them in when they retire or are of old age. Over four hundred surveys were filled 
out but only one hundred completed surveys were analyzed. 74 females and 26 males filled out 
the survey. Manutech workers consist of proportionally more females than males. 
 
Findings: The age of the workers ranged from 20 to 61. The average age of the group was 33 
years. Only 16 out of 100 workers said that their grandparents live with them (if alive). Twenty 
of them said that they live with both their parents and their children. 68% of the workers said that 
they were the main financial source of the family. 47% of them said that they do not expect their 
family or children to financially help them when they retire. The average age of the workers who 
do not expect financial help after retirement was 26 compared to 34 for the ones who expect 
help. 49% of females who filled out the survey do not expect financial help when they retire 
compared to 42% of males. 
 
Conclusion: The traditional informal financial means of support for the old aged is weakening in 
Haiti. The survey shows that the younger generation is less likely to depend on their children or 
family for financial support during their old age. Thus, other formal means of support such as a 
strong pension plan needs to be present to support workers when they retire. 
 
Limitations: One of the officers translated the survey from English to Haitian Creole for the 
workers at the company. The translation might not have been fully accurate. Some workers 
might have filled out wrong information such as age or family size. The size of the sample 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Key Economic Facts
 
Source: globaledge.msu.edu                                     Numbers rounded to the nearest trillion dollars 
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Appendix B: CSPP – Benefit formula 
Age Years of contributions Replacement Rate Monthly Ceiling 
 Less than 25 Restitution of Contributions  
55 25 – 29 60% of best salary HGD15 Thousand 
55 30 – 39 60% of best salary HGD25 Thousand 
55 40 100% of best salary HGD30 Thousand 
Source: The World Bank 
 
Appendix C: O.N.A. Income Statement – June 30, 2007 
 
 (Exprimé en gourdes haïtiennes) 
REVENUS  
Intérêts Gagnés 26,238,652.85 
Escomptes gagnés 6,211,989.73 
Revenu de Placement 15,219,090.64 








Salaires & charges sociales 
 
244,664,907.98 
V Honoraires professionnels 5,992,023.36 
Autres dépenses du personnel 6,901,016.20 
Publicité 17,563,200.98 
Frais de déplacement 2,736,438.74 
Amortiss. Des immobilisations 11,370,857.66 
Eau, Electricité, Téléphone 1,069,619.26 
Entretien & réparation 5,926,622.02 
Carburants & lubrifiants 5,038,577.50 
Frais financiers 12,835.00 
Subvention 54,734,704.00 
Dons & Assistance sociale. 4,906,380.50 
Fourniture utilisée & impres. 9,003,200.25 
Loyer 407,500.00 
Assurance Immeuble 517,054.66 
Assurance Véhicule 110,310.59 
Autres dépenses 8,460,225.39 
TOTAL CHARGES 379,415,474.09 
 
DEFICIT OU EXCEDENT 
 
(327,696,141.46)   
Source: The World Bank 
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Appendix D:  ONA. – Contribution schedule 
Monthly Salary Bracket Employer Employee 
0 – 200 2% 2% 
200 – 500 3% 3% 
500 – 1000  4% 4% 
1000 – more 6% 6% 
Source: ssa.gov 
 
Appendix E. ONA. – Pension benefit formula 
Age Years of contributions Replacement Rate Monthly Ceiling 
 Less than 10 Restitution of contributions with immediate 
vesting of employers’ contributions 
 
55 10 – 20 1.6% accrual rate x avg. salary of best 10 years 
x no. of yrs. of contribution 
HGD15 Thousand 
55 20 and over Same 1/3 average salary of best 
10 years 
Source: The World Bank 
 
Appendix F: TELECO. – Pension benefit formula 
Age Min Years of 
contributions 
Formula Ceiling 
 <15 Restitution of contributions with immediate vesting  
45 15 Choice of deferred pension at age 55 (see formula 
below) 
70% of highest salary 
55 15 2% accrual rate x arithmetic avg. best 5 year salary 
x no. of years in service 
70% of highest salary 
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Appendix H: Analysis of Loan Motives – January 05 – Dec 07 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Source:	  SAFICO,	  Haiti	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   



















FV 6,000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PV -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PMT
Years 25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rate	  1 2.5%
PMT 1 176              
Rate 2 9%
PMT 2 71                	  Credit	  Plan 
19
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Appendix I:  
 
 
Debt	  Principal 100.00	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interest	  Rate 0.01	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Number	  of	  Periods 24.00	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
FV -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Payment Interest Principal Remaining	  Principal
1st	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.00	  	  	  	  	  	   3.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   96.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2nd	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.96	  	  	  	  	  	   3.74	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   92.55	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3rd	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.93	  	  	  	  	  	   3.78	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   88.77	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.89	  	  	  	  	  	   3.82	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   84.95	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.85	  	  	  	  	  	   3.86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   81.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.81	  	  	  	  	  	   3.90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   77.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.77	  	  	  	  	  	   3.94	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   73.26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.73	  	  	  	  	  	   3.97	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   69.28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.69	  	  	  	  	  	   4.01	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   65.27	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.65	  	  	  	  	  	   4.05	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   61.21	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.61	  	  	  	  	  	   4.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   57.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.57	  	  	  	  	  	   4.14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   52.98	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.53	  	  	  	  	  	   4.18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   48.80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.49	  	  	  	  	  	   4.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   44.58	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.45	  	  	  	  	  	   4.26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   40.32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.40	  	  	  	  	  	   4.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   36.02	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.36	  	  	  	  	  	   4.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   31.67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.32	  	  	  	  	  	   4.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   27.28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.27	  	  	  	  	  	   4.43	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   22.85	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.23	  	  	  	  	  	   4.48	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   18.37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21st	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.18	  	  	  	  	  	   4.52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13.84	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22nd	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.14	  	  	  	  	  	   4.57	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   9.28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23rd	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.09	  	  	  	  	  	   4.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24th	  Payment 4.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.05	  	  	  	  	  	   4.66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.00	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112.98	  	  	  
13%Annual	  rate	  of	  reurn
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Appendix J: USD/HTG Exchange Rate 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance 
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